

Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy

Type de contenu : Texte

Type de médiation : sans médiation

Type de support : Volume

Titre(s) : Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy / Todd S. Sechser,..., Matthew Fuhrmann,...

Auteur(s) : Sechser, Todd S.

Autre(s) auteur(s) : Fuhrmann, Matthew (1980-....)

Publication : Cambridge [etc.] : Cambridge university press, 2017

Description matérielle : 1 vol. (XIII-333 p.) : tabl. ; 23 cm

ISBN : 978-1-107-10694-9

1-107-10694-X

978-1-107-51451-5

1-107-51451-7

EAN : 9781107514515 br.

Classification décimale Dewey : 358.391

Note sur les bibliographies et les index : Bibliogr. p. 290-317. Index

Résumé ou extrait : La p. I indique : "Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy ? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries ? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive."

Sujet - Nom commun : Guerre nucléaire

Politique militaire -- Études de cas

Diplomatie

Relations internationales

Relations extérieures -- États-Unis