Thèse

Allies that count : junior partners in coalition warfare / Olivier Schmitt

  • Texte
  • sans médiation
  • Volume
  • Allies that count : junior partners in coalition warfare / Olivier Schmitt
  • Washington : Georgetown university press
  • C 2018
  • 1 vol. (XVI-244 pages) : ill., graph., tabl. ; 23 cm
  • 978-1-62616-546-5
  • 1-62616-546-7
  • 978-1-62616-547-2
  • 1-62616-547-5
  • 9781626165472 br.
  • 355.356
  • Bibliographie pages 217-238. Index
  • Texte remanié de Thesis (Ph. D) War studies King's College London 2014
  • Présentation de l'éditeur : "What qualities make an ally useful in coalition warfare, and when is an ally more trouble than its worth? This book analyzes the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare and reaches surprising conclusions. Olivier Schmitt conducts detailed case-study analysis of several US allies in the Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan. He also does a broader analysis of 204 junior partners in various interventions since the end of the Cold War. Schmitt aims to bridge a gap in previous studies about coalition warfare, while also contributing to policy debates about a recurring defense dilemma. Previous works about coalition warfare have focused on explaining how coalitions are formed, but little attention has been given to the issue of their effectiveness. At the same time, policy debates, have framed the issue of junior partners in multinational military operations in terms of a trade-off between the legitimacy that is allegedly gained from a large number of coalition states vs. the decrease in military effectiveness associated with the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. Schmitt determines which political and military variables are more likely to create utility, and he challenges the conventional wisdom about the supposed benefit of having as many states as possible in a coalition."
  • This thesis explores the issue of the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare in the post-Cold War era. It begins with the observation that the International Relations and strategic studies literatures are surprisingly under-developed on the issue of coalition warfare, in particular when it comes to exploring the relations between the coalition leader and the junior partners. This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom about coalition-building in the post-Cold War era. It argues that there are two distinct, albeit mutually reinforcing, causal paths to utility: the first is the standing of a state participating to the intervention, the second is the combination of integration and quality of its armed forces. In order establish this result, the thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, combining a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) conducted on 204 cases with detailed case studies of twelve states participating in four multinational military interventions after the Cold War. This core finding has two major consequences. First, in coalition warfare, the more is not necessarily the merrier. There is no linear relation between a junior partner's, participation to an intervention, and an increase of the legitimacy and/or military effectiveness of the said intervention. For the utility of a junior partner to be established, the conditions of standing and/or the combination of integration and quality must be met. Second, it is very rare to have a clear trade-off between military and political utility. In most cases, the two causal mechanisms leading to utility are simultaneous. These findings have important consequences for both research on alliances and policy-making.
Lien copié.
Build V.5.2.2 - 2ecb916194 (29/04/2026 07:35:08)