Thèse

Combining concepts : operational shock in insurgencies / [Ryan J. Bulger]

Type de contenu

• Texte

Type de médiation

• sans médiation

Titre(s)

• Combining concepts : operational shock in insurgencies / [Ryan J. Bulger]

Auteur(s)

• Bulger, Ryan J.

Mention d'édition

• [Reprod. en fac-sim.]

Editeur, producteur

• [Lieu de publication inconnu] : [CreateSpace independent publishing platform, 2015]

Description matérielle

• 1 vol. (62 p.) ; 28 cm

ISBN

• 978-1-5114471-2-6

EAN

• 9781511447126 br.

Classification décimale Dewey

• 355.023

Note sur les bibliographies et les index

• Bibliogr. p. 60-62. Notes bibliogr.

Note sur l'original reproduit

• Reprod. en fac-sim. de l'édition originale, Fort Leavenworth (Kan.) : US Army Command and general staff College [2014]

Note de thèses et écrits académiques

• Dissertation Art et science militaires Fort Leavenworth (Kan.), US Army Command and general staff College [2014]

Résumé ou extrait

• Présentation de l'éditeur : "The focus of this work is to ascertain whether the concept of operational shock, which has served as the intellectual underpinning of the US Army's doctrine over the past thirty years, can be used to guide an operational approach in a counterinsurgency campaign. The concept of operational shock sits at the foundation of much of United States Army's operational doctrine. The American way of war now focuses not on the destruction of an enemy's equipment and personnel, but on degrading and disrupting his ability to continue to fight. Much of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory does not fit this operational logic. The previous decade of war has led to a renewed debate both in public and inside the national security apparatus of the United States. With the publication of Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the United States produced its first doctrine dedicated to countering insurgency in over twenty years. The logic within FM 3-24 dictates that if the counterinsurgent can dissolve the conditions that enabled the existence of the insurgency, the governmental forces can change the logic of the population. This paper does not refute the principle of addressing core grievances, which stands at the center of much of current counterinsurgency theory. It does, however, posit that to effectively set conditions to affect the logic of the population, the counterinsurgent must affect the logic of the insurgency it is opposing. The intent of this monograph is neither to prove nor disprove either the enemy centric or the population centric models of counterinsurgency, but instead to argue that there must be a balance of both approaches. There may be a time during a counterinsurgency campaign where the disruption of the insurgency's logic and causing a fractionalization within the enemy system should be the focus of the counterinsurgent's operations. This monograph examines both the theoretical basis for current operational and counterinsurgent doctrine."

Sujet - Nom commun

• Contre-guérilla -- Études de cas
• Doctrines militaires
• Révoltes -- Études de cas
• Art des opérations (science militaire)
• Guerre asymétrique
• Guerre d'Irak (2003-2011)

Sujet - Nom géographique

• Oman -- 1964-1976 (Guerre du Dhofar)

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