Monographie

Staying the unfavorable course : national security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan policy, 2001-2016 / Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans,... [et al.]

Type de contenu
  • Texte
Type de médiation
  • sans médiation
Type de support
  • Volume
Titre(s)
  • Staying the unfavorable course : national security Council decisionmaking and the inertia of U.S. Afghanistan policy, 2001-2016 / Matthew Sargent, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans,... [et al.]
Auteur(s)
Autre(s) auteur(s)
Autre(s) responsabilité(s)
Publication
  • Santa Monica (Calif.) : Rand
Date de copyright
  • C 2023
Description matérielle
  • 1 vol. (XVII-160 p.) : ill., graph. ; 23 cm
Collection
  • Research report RR-A808-1
ISBN
  • 1-977410-44-8
  • 978-1-977410-44-3
EAN
  • 9781977410443 br.
Appartient à la collection
  • Research report RR-A808-1
Autre variante du titre
  • [National Security Council Decisionmaking and the Inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016.]
Classification décimale Dewey
  • 958.104 7
Note sur la description bibliographique
  • Consultable à l'adresse
Note sur la responsabilité
  • Autres contributeurs : Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, Richard S. Girven (coauteurs)
Note sur les bibliographies et les index
  • Bibliogr. p. 143-160
Note sur le contenu
  • Chapter One: Introduction Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process Chapter Seven: Conclusions
Résumé ou extrait
  • From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission.
Sujet - Nom commun
Sujet - Nom géographique
Adresse électronique et mode d'accès
Lien copié.
Build V.5.2.2 - 2ecb916194 (29/04/2026 07:35:08)